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In early monetary systems the unit of account was separate from the medium of exchange. 
Commodity prices and prices of coins were quoted in terms of a fixed quantity of metal 
that  was  embodied  by  an  'index  coin'.  Coins  circulated  at  their  metal  value  because 
coinage was imperfect and fixed exchange rates would have interfered with the operation 
of bimetallism. An indication that the exchange rates of coins were market determined is 
the absence of value marks on coins. During the Industrial Revolution, improvements in 
the quality of coinage led to the fusion of the unit of account and medium of exchange 
function of money. As a consequence, pre-industrial bimetallism gave way to nineteenth 
century bimetallism, in which the make of currencies alternated between silver and gold.  
 
 
   1 
Bimetallism  prevailed  for  almost  two  and  a  half  millennia,  from  the  origins  of 
coinage in antiquity until the nineteenth century. In early bimetallism full-valued gold coins 
circulated side by side with silver coins, occasionally supplemented by token coins, which 
were  made  of  an  alloy  of  base  metals.  During  the  Industrial  Revolution,  the  historic 
bimetallic  standard  degenerated,  giving  way  to  a  bimodal  monetary  standard,  in  which, 
depending on market conditions, the make of currencies alternated between silver and gold. 
Unlike  pre-industrial  bimetallism,  nineteenth  century  bimetallism  was  essentially 
monometallic, with each metal intermittently serving as medium of exchange. By the end of 
the  nineteenth  century, all  major  countries  were  on monometallic  standards: Europe and 
America  on  gold  and  Asian  countries  on  silver.  Compared  with  the  endurance  of 
bimetallism, the gold-standard era was short, providing a mere transition period between 
historic bimetallism and the modern paper standard that eventually arose during the twentieth 
century.  
Monetary economists tend to deplore the demise of bimetallism.
2 Friedman (1990a,b) 
argues that the abandonment of bimetallism by the United States was a costly policy mistake 
that went largely unnoticed  when  Congress debated  the Coinage Act of 1873. Gallarotti 
(1994) suggests that policy makers succumbed to a "growing ideological attraction to gold" 
in both Europe and the United States. Oppers (1996) takes this as evidence that Germany and 
the Latin Monetary Union capriciously switched to gold in the 1870s. Flandreau (1996) calls 
the  emergence  of  the  international  gold  standard  a  "blatant  failure  of  international 
cooperation."  However,  the  fact  that  bimetallism  was  abandoned  universally  and 
permanently makes it unlikely that the adoption of monometallism was an inadvertent policy 
mistake. It is also unclear why this alleged policy mistake should have occurred in the 1870s 
and not at another time, maybe two hundred years earlier? The main flaw of the view that the 
switch to monometallism was avoidable is that it compares the gold standard, which took 
hold in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the degenerate nineteenth century 
bimetallism  that  preceded  it.  De  facto  monometallism  had  emerged  in  most  industrial 
countries already decades before the official change to gold, which simply recognized the 
                                                 
2 The main advantage of nineteenth century bimetallism was that the purchasing power of the 
monetary  unit  was  more  stable  than  in  monometallism,  at  least  as  long  as  both  metals 
remained in circulation. For analyses of nineteenth century bimetallism see Niehans (1978, 
ch. 8), Barro (1979), McCallum (1989, ch. 13), Redish (1995), Dowd (1996), Eichengreen 
(1996, ch. 2), Sargent and Smith (1997) and Flandreau (2004).     2 
prevailing state of monetary affairs. Thus, the historic dividing line between bimetallism and 
monometallism  lies  not  in  the  1870s,  but  decades  earlier  (in  Great  Britain  more  than  a 
century earlier), when pre-industrial bimetallism, in which gold and silver coins circulated 
side by side, gave way to alternating nineteenth century bimetallism. 
This  paper  reviews  the  history  of  bimetallism from antiquity until  the  nineteenth 
century. The analysis focuses on the fundamentals of bimetallism, namely the technological 
and institutional conditions that determined the process of coinage. The main argument is (1) 
that  pre-industrial  bimetallism  differed  from  nineteenth  century  bimetallism  and  (2)  that 
technical  advances  in  the  process  of  coinage  made  bimetallism  unworkable  during  the 
Industrial  Revolution.  In  pre-industrial  times  the  unit  of  account  was  separate  from  the 
medium of exchange because the quality of coins was poor. The crux of the argument is that 
there  is  no  obvious  unit  of  account  in  a  metallic  monetary  system  with  heterogeneous 
coinage. As there was no high quality coin that could have served as unit of account, how did 
merchants  quote  prices  and  in  what  unit  of  account  did  they  conduct  commercial 
calculations? The hypothesis in this paper is that pre-industrial merchants used the official 
mint  weight  of  a  leading  coin  of  their  hometown  for  accounting  purposes.  Thus,  both 
commodity  prices  and  prices  of  coins  (exchange  rates) were quoted in  terms of  a  fixed 
quantity of metal, embodied by an 'index coin'.
3 Even specimens of the index coin had a 
market  price  that  deviated  from  parity  because  of  wear  and  tear  and  deliberate  abuse. 
Therefore, the index coin did not enjoy a decisive advantage as a medium of exchange, and it 
circulated side by side with other coins, even though its official metal weight served as unit 
of account. The index coin stayed on an equal footing with other coins as a medium of 
exchange until the Industrial Revolution. Then, the quality improvement in coinage gave rise 
to de facto monometallism by fusing the unit of account function of the index coin with the 
medium of exchange function. The ability to circulate at par gave the index coin (and its 
multiples and fractions) a decisive advantage as medium of exchange. At the same time, the 
operation of Gresham's Law frustrated attempts to retain a bimetallic coinage by defining the 
unit of account in both silver and gold. Thus, the quality improvement in coinage lies at the 
                                                 
3 In Weber (1996) I used the term 'link coin', following a practice found among economic 
historians (see Lane and Mueller (1985) and Harl (1996)). I now prefer the term 'index coin' 
because its official mint weight anchors the price level.   3 
root of the transformation of pre-industrial bimetallism to de facto monometallism during the 
nineteenth century.
4 
The index coin hypothesis complements standard price theory in order to explain the 
purchasing power of money in a monetary system with heterogeneous coinage. Economic 
forces determine the exchange value of a unit of monetary metal and the official mint weight 
of the index coin anchors the purchasing power of the unit of account. The mint weight of 
the index coin, the inverse of the official price of the monetary metal, is a purely nominal 
concept, playing the same role as the money stock in a paper standard. Deliberate changes in 
the mint weight of the index coin produced proportional changes in the purchasing power of 
the unit of account. This paper applies the index coin hypothesis to the monetary systems of 
ancient Greece (Section 1), Rome (Section 2) and the Middle Ages (Section 3), and to the 
transition  of  pre-industrial  bimetallism  to  de  facto  monometallism  during  the  Industrial 
Revolution (Sections 4 and 5). The conclusion (Section 6) relates the index coin hypothesis 
to issues in modern monetary economics. 
 
1. The Origins of Bimetallism in the Greek World 
Coinage was invented in western Turkey in the late seventh century BC.
5 The region 
was inhabited by Greeks, who lived in coastal cities, and by the Lydians, whose capital 
Sardes lay further inland. The earliest coins consisted of electrum, a natural alloy of gold and 
silver  (white  gold),  which  was  found  locally  in  alluvial  deposits.  Geological  processes 
determined  the  composition  of  natural  electrum,  although  mints  quickly  mastered  the 
technique of alloying electrum. The analysis of two coins yielded 47.8% and 50.0% of gold, 
and 47.0% and 43.3% of silver, the remainder being accounted for by impurities (Cooper 
1988, p. 8). Electrum coins played a significant role in early monetary history, circulating in 
western  Turkey  and  the  Black  Sea  area  from  the  seventh  until  the fourth centuries  BC. 
                                                 
4 Redish (1990, 2000) and Sargent and Velde (2002) pointed out the importance of changes 
in  minting  technology  for  the  operation  of  metallic  monetary  standards.  Their  analysis 
focuses on the role of token coins in the gold standard. Selgin (2003) questions their finding 
that the mechanization of mints solved the small-change problem. 
5 Sources for this section include Melville-Jones (1986), and Carradice and Price (1988).    4 
Remarkably, the history of coinage had started with a symmetallic standard, as envisaged by 
Marshall (1887).
6  
The legendary Croesus (561-546 BC), the last king of Lydia, is often credited with 
the creation of pure silver and gold coins. But silver coins emerged on the island of Aegina, 
across the Aegean Sea, at about the same time (and possibly somewhat earlier). In the sixth 
century  BC,  coinage  spread  from  western  Turkey  to  the  Greek mainland  and  beyond to 
Greek cities in Sicily and southern Italy. Apart from the early use of electrum, Greek cities 
almost exclusively struck silver coins until well into the classical period (the time from the 
Persian wars (492-479 BC) until Alexander the Great (356-323 BC)). The first significant 
amount of gold coinage was issued by Athens when Sparta occupied the silver mines at 
Laurium  during  the  Peloponnesian  War  (431-404  BC).  Philip  II  (382-336  BC),  who 
established Macedonian hegemony in Greece, minted both silver and gold coins, although 
most gold coins may have been issued posthumously by his son Alexander (Carradice and 
Price 1988, ch. 7).
7 On the Persian campaign, Alexander founded a large number of mints, 
introducing the practice of coinage as far eastward as the Indus valley. Earlier, coins had 
been struck only in the western satrapies (provinces) of the Persian Empire, in the former 
kingdom of Lydia. 
Almost every Greek city and island minted coins, displaying a variety of designs, 
including animals, mythological figures and gods. Some coins were more ubiquitous than 
others (for example the Athenian silver 'owls' in the second half of the fifth century BC), but 
no mint ever established a monopoly in the Greek world. The 'owls' of Athens competed with 
the 'turtles' of Aegina, the 'colts' (named after Pegasus) of Corinth, and other coins. At the 
pinnacle  of  Hellenistic  influence,  during  the  fifth  and  fourth  centuries  BC,  Greek  coins 
circulated  freely  in  the  Mediterranean  and  the  East,  from  Spain  to  the  Indus  valley. 
                                                 
6 Symmetallism differs from nineteenth century bimetallism inasmuch as the monetary unit 
is  defined  in  terms of a composite consisting  of fixed parts of silver and gold (and not 
independently in terms of both silver and gold). For this reason, there exists no imputed 
relative price between silver and gold that might differ from the market ratio, the Achilles’ 
heel of nineteenth century bimetallism. Marshall’s idea was to choose the relative weights of 
silver and gold in order to stabilize the price level. Friedman (1951) extended the concept of 
symmetallism to commodity-reserve currencies. 
7 Early Celtic coinage imitated Philips’s silver and gold coinage (Collis 1984, p. 144). Nash 
(1987) discusses coinage in the Celtic world. 
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Alexander put his portrait on imperial coins, but his rule was too short to secure a lasting 
dominance of imperial coinage. After Alexander's death, the diadochi (Alexander’s generals) 
carved up the empire and new royal coinages emerged. During the Hellenistic period, which 
lasted  from  Alexander’s  death  until  the  ascendancy  of  Rome,  Greek  coinage became  so 
complex that, according to Carradice and Price (1988, p. 122), "no coherent account of it has 
ever been produced." 
The  names  of  Greek  coinages,  stater  and  drachma,  are  derived  from  commercial 
weights. The word stater means "that which balances the scales", and drachma originated 
from drax, the Greek word for a "handful of spits". As commercial weight standards varied 
across cities, coinages were struck to mixed standards. The Corinthian stater weighted 8.6 
grams, the Aeginetic stater was 12.2 grams, the Milesian or Lydian stater was 14.1 grams, 
and the Euboeic stater was 17.2 grams. The drachma represented a smaller weight: 2.85 
grams  at  Corinth,  somewhat  over  four  grams  at  Athens,  and  slightly  over  six  grams  at 
Aegina. Hence, the Corinthian stater was a three-drachmae piece, the Aeginetic stater was a 
didrachmon, with similar relationships existing elsewhere. Coinages included elaborate sets 
of multiples and fractions of the basic monetary unit. Multiples usually followed the dual 
system (didrachm, tetradrachm) and fractions were expressed as one sixth. The obol was one 
sixth of a drachma.  
The  legacy  of  Greek  coins  suggests  that  merchants  were  accustomed  to  use  a 
heterogeneous  coinage  that  was  issued  by  a  large  number  of  mints.  In  this  monetary 
environment, how did merchants quote prices and in what unit of account did they conduct 
commercial  calculations?  The  hypothesis  in  this  paper  is  that  the  unit  of  account  was 
separate from the medium of exchange. Accordingly, merchants used the official mint weight 
of a leading coin of their hometown for accounting purposes. Thus, both commodity prices 
and prices  of coins (exchange  rates) were quoted in  terms of  a  fixed quantity of metal, 
embodied  by  an  index  coin.  Even  specimens  of  the  index  coin  had  a  market  price  that 
deviated from parity if they were badly worn. If for example the drachma of Athens served as 
index coin, then all other coins were valued in terms of the official silver weight of the 
drachma (somewhat more than four grams), while underweight drachma pieces traded at a 
discount. For this reason, the drachma did not enjoy a decisive advantage as medium of 
exchange, and it circulated  side  by side with other  coins, even though its official  silver 
weight served as unit of account.   6 
The omission of value marks on Greek coins suggests that they circulated at market 
determined exchange rates. Value marks would have been a nuisance because they would 
have conflicted with actual exchange rates if coins were imperfect. In monetary history the 
absence of value marks is a reliable sign that coins traded at exchange rates that depended on 
their true metal weight and prevailing metal prices. Major coins lacked value marks from 
antiquity  until  the  eighteenth  century  (with  a  notable  exception  during  the  late  Roman 
Republic). On the other hand, the use of value marks indicates that coins were designed to 
circulate as tokens whose assigned values exceeded their true metal value. In Greek times, 
tokens were used only for emergency issues and minor denominations. Among the earliest 
tokens were those of Timotheus, an Athenian general, who paid his troops with bronze coins 
in the war against the Chalcidian League (364-359 BC). The coins, which were marked with 
one or two dots, were designed to pass for one or two obols. It remains an open question 
whether Timotheus’s promise to redeem the coins after the war and his prospects of victory 
were sufficiently credible to establish parity with the silver obol.
8 
In  general,  the  quality  of  Greek  coins  was  high,  although  there  are  examples  of 
carefully filed coins, in particular from the early centuries of coinage. This confirms that 
coins circulated at market determined exchange rates. Free exchange rates between coins 
protected against deliberate abuse because it is not worthwhile to painstakingly clip and file 
coins if this reduces their value by the very amount to be gained through these practices. The 
abuse of coins is profitable only if maltreated coins can be passed on at official exchange 
rates, irrespective of their true metal weight. Since the valuation of coins required special 
skills, some cities, for example Athens in c. 375 BC, employed officials who tested coins and 
settled disputes among merchants. According to an inscription, the officials certified local 
coins (and possibly foreign coins that were at par with local ones), giving them legal tender 
status.
9 Yet, the certifiers did not impose unrealistic exchange rates because this would have 
led to the widespread abuse of coins, for which, unlike in medieval Europe, there is no 
evidence in Greek times. For these reasons, in Athens the index coin was the drachma, which 
was accepted by tale (by counting individual coins) if it conformed to the official standard, 
                                                 
8 Dots were also used on early bronze tokens in Greek colonies in Sicily, indicating the 
number of unciae. 
9 Melville-Jones (1993, p. 59) reprints the inscription.   7 
and which, together with foreign coins,  was  traded  at market determined rates  if  it  was 
underweight.  
Deliberate inflation through a reduction in the mint weight of the index coin was 
uncommon during antiquity. Usually, the mint weight of the index coin remained close to the 
corresponding commercial weight standard. Commercial weights that were inscribed with 
their coin equivalents show that the mint weight of the Athenian drachma was only about 
five percent less than the commercial drachma weight (Carradice and Price 1988, p. 92). 
Actually,  this  may  have  been  the  brassage  (mint-charge).  In  the  ancient  world  currency 
competition prevented deliberate inflation by a single city because the public could easily 
switch to more stable coinages, putting the mint of the inflating city out of business. The 
only substantial monetary debasement occurred in Ptolemaic Egypt, at the periphery of the 
Hellenistic world.
10 The distant location of Egypt, which could be reached only by sea and 
through  deserts,  enabled  the  monetary  authority  to  suppress  currency  substitution  by 
controlling the influx of foreign coinage. 
 
2. Roman Monetary Standards 
During  the first half of  the third century BC, Rome gained control of peninsular 
Italy.
11 Then, the struggle for supremacy in the western Mediterranean led to three wars with 
Carthage, the so-called Punic Wars (264-241, 219-202, and 149-146 BC). After civil wars in 
the first century BC, the Roman Republic gave way to the Imperial system, which survived 
until the fifth century AD. Rome operated several monetary systems during its long history: 
key dates include the currency reform during the Second Punic War and the introduction of 
imperial coinage. Accordingly, it is convenient to distinguish between three time periods in 
Roman monetary history: the early Republican monetary system before the Second Punic 
War,  the  Republican  monetary  system  from  the  Second  Punic  War  until  the  end  of  the 
Republic, and the Imperial monetary system. 
 
                                                 
10 Heichelheim (1930) analyzes the Ptolemaic monetary system, drawing on the large number 
of papyri that have survived from this period. 
11 Sources for this section include Crawford (1974, 1985), Burnett (1987), Melville-Jones 
(1990) and Harl (1996). 
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Early Republican Money 
At the beginning of the third century BC, Rome had a primitive bronze coinage. As 
the value of bronze was low, early Roman bronze 'coins' consisted of unwieldy bars and 
discs that were ill-suited for commercial transactions. The bronze bars, which were adorned 
by various designs, weighed about 1.5 to 1.6 kilograms, and the largest disc, the 'as', was 
initially one Roman pound (about 324 grams).
12 Bronze bars and coins were manufactured 
through casting, which is less precise than striking coins. Despite the shortcomings of bronze 
coinage, Rome produced only small quantities of silver drachmae and virtually no gold coins 
before the Second Punic War. Instead, Romans used silver drachmae from Hellenistic cities 
in southern Italy, whose monetary systems were more advanced.  
The  early  Roman  monetary  system  operated  along  the  principles  of  a  metallic 
monetary  standard  with  heterogeneous  coinage.  Roman  merchants  had  to  deal  with  an 
uneven domestic coinage and a variety of foreign coins. The leading local coin, the bronze 
'as',  served  as  index  coin,  providing  the  unit  of  account  in  the  early  Roman  system  of 
reckoning.  The  'as'  system  of  account  defined  a  wide  range  of  denominations,  whose 
coherence appears to have been a Roman innovation. A dupondius was worth two asses, 
while  the  subdivisions  of  the  'as'  included  the  semis  (1/2),  triens  (1/3),  quadrans  (1/4), 
sextans (1/6), uncia (1/12) and semuncia (1/24). These denominations were applied to both 
money of account and money in coin.
13 Small coins carried value marks in the form of 
pellets that stood for one uncia. The use of value marks suggests that the subdivisions of the 
'as' were accepted by tale because value marks implied fixed exchange rates between coins. 
Small coins circulated by tale because the transaction costs of assessing small change would 
have  been prohibitive  in  daily  dealings. Even  modest commercial transactions, however, 
required a heavy load of bronze coinage – bars and discs – which were used at true metal 
weight. Thus, although the official mint weight of the 'as' served as unit of account, 'as' 
                                                 
12 Roman weights included the libra (pound), uncia and scrupulum. One pound equaled 12 
ounces and one ounce was 24 scruples. Approximate modern weight equivalents are: pound 
(324 grams), ounce (27 grams) and scruple (1.125 grams), but Roman weights are uncertain. 
The scruple is often defined as 1.137 grams, although this is inconsistent with the likely 
weight of the pound (324 grams). 
13 Other multiples and fractions of the 'as' unit of account included decussis (10), quinquessis 
(5), quadrussis (4), tressis (3), bes (2/3) and quincunx (5/12). These values were rarely used 
for coinage.   9 
coinage did not enjoy a decisive advantage as medium of exchange because, along with all 
other coins, it had to be valued in terms of 'as' money of account in commercial transactions.  
Rome abandoned the bronze standard during the Second Punic War. Between 218 
and 214 BC, the official mint weight of the bronze 'as' fell from ten to three ounces. The 
usual explanation for this is that fiscal stress during the war destroyed the Roman bronze 
standard.  Accordingly,  Rome  deliberately  debased  the  'as'  in  order  to  finance  the  war. 
However, the military demand for bronze, which was used for armor and weaponry, probably 
increased the value of bronze. Therefore, the reduction in the mint weight of the 'as' may 
have been designed to offset the deflationary effect of a rise in the value of bronze. The 
debasement of the 'as' by 70% allowed for a tripling of the bronze price, which does not 
appear unrealistic during a major war. This interpretation suggests that the bronze standard 
was abandoned because of excessive fluctuations in the value of bronze during the Second 
Punic War.
14 Another motive for the introduction of precious metals coinage was that low-
value bronze coinage was unsuitable to meet the needs of wartime finance. The upkeep of 
large armies would have required literally shiploads of bronze. 
 
Republican Money 
Around 211 BC, Rome adopted a bimetallic silver-gold standard that quickly turned 
into a de facto silver standard. The new index coin was the silver denarius, which initially 
weighed  about  4.5  grams  or  four  scruples, with a high degree of  fineness (about  98%). 
Despite the emphasis on precious metals (in practice silver), the new monetary standard still 
showed vestiges of the earlier predominance of bronze, as Romans continued to reckon in 
asses. But counting in asses had become an empty custom because one 'as' in money of 
account always equaled one tenth of a denarius, the index coin in the new silver standard. 
The official mint weight of the silver denarius determined the purchasing power of the 'as' in 
money of account. At the same time, the tangible 'as' became a low quality token coin, whose 
composition and weight was subject to great variation.  
Rome created the first coinage with explicit value marks in monetary history. The 'as' 
bore the Roman numeral I, making it the unit of account. The silver denarius, the true index 
                                                 
14 During the Roman Republic, the silver-bronze ratio was volatile, with a normal ratio of 
1:120,  and  (tentative)  extremes  of  1:60  and  1:625  (Melville-Jones  (1986,  p.  143)  and 
Heichelheim (1930, p. 28)).   10
coin, carried the numeral X, stipulating a value of 10 asses. Gold coins were struck in three 
denominations: ↓X (sixty asses), XXXX (forty asses) and XX (twenty asses). The silver 
coins below the denarius, the quinarius and sestertius, were marked V and IIs, indicating 5 
and 2.5 asses. The 'as' was subdivided into 12 ounces that were represented by pellets on the 
triens (····), the quadrans (···), the sextans (··) and the uncia (·). The semis was marked by an 
S (in lieu of six pellets), while the smallest coin, the semiuncia, displayed the symbol ε.
15  
The introduction of value marks profoundly changed the operation of the Roman 
monetary system because they gave coins legal tender status in transactions that were defined 
in terms of asses. Mommsen (1860, pp. 194-95), whose work on ancient monetary systems 
influenced  monetary  historians  and  numismatists  well  into  the  twentieth  century,  clearly 
recognized the legal tender aspect of value marks: 
“It was not only to assist in recognition and valuation of pieces that the Romans 
marked their money.  … There was a law which gave to money so marked an official value, 
independent of its intrinsic value … these pieces alone were considered as coins, and all 
other  kinds  of  money  were  in  the  eyes  of  the  law  but  merchandise.  All  commercial 
transactions in national money so prescribed gave rise to a special and very severe procedure 
(actio pecuniæ certæ), all others gave the right only to the repayment of equivalent value, 
and could give rise only to a simple action (quanti ea res est). Whoever made a contract by 
weight doubtless did not lose the right of weighing when it pleased the creditor to pay him in 
asses, but whoever had to receive a fixed sum in asses had not the right to ask that they 
should be weighed, and had to accept them whatever their weight and fineness.” (Translated 
by Burns (1927, p. 380, n. 2)) 
 
Thus, coins that bore value marks were used by tale in transactions that were defined 
in the 'as' unit of account.   
The  application  of  value  marks  seriously  impaired  the  working  of  Republican 
bimetallism because the assigned values engendered fixed exchange rates between silver and 
gold coins. As predicted by Gresham's Law, Republican bimetallism almost immediately 
                                                 
15 At the beginning of the denarius period, Rome issued large quantities of silver victoriatii, 
which were somewhat lighter and less fine than the denarius. The victoriatus, whose role in 
the Roman monetary system remains controversial, did not carry a value mark. 
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collapsed  into  a  de  facto  silver  standard  because  silver  coins  were  officially  overvalued 
relative  to  gold  coins.
16  A  sixty  'as'  gold  piece  weighed  about  3.35  grams  and  a  silver 
denarius (equivalent to ten asses) was 4.5 grams (Crawford 1974, p. 154). This implied an 
official  silver-gold  ratio  of  eight,  which was  far  below  the normal market ratio that  lay 
between  ten  and  thirteen  in  antiquity.  It  is  uncertain  why  the  founders  of  Republican 
bimetallism chose an official silver-gold ratio that was too low. They may have done so 
because  precious  metal  prices  were  distorted  at  the  inception  of  bimetallism  during  the 
Second Punic War. It is suggestive that the influx of war booty – silver and gold – started in 
212 BC, shortly before the currency reform.  
There existed two ways to create deliberate inflation in the Republican 'as' system of 
account. The monetary authorities could reduce the purchasing power of the 'as' by debasing 
the silver denarius or they could directly devalue the 'as' in terms of the denarius. The official 
mint weight of the denarius remained fairly stable during the Republic. The only substantial 
debasement occurred during the first half of the second century BC, when the mint weight of 
the denarius fell from 4.5 to 3.9 grams. However, in 141 BC the Roman monetary authorities 
reduced the value of the 'as' unit of account to 1/16 of a denarius. Accordingly, the value 
mark on the denarius was changed from X to XVI. This devaluation of the 'as' destroyed its 
usefulness as unit of account. Indeed, Romans reckoned in 'as' until its devaluation in 141 
BC and in sestertii afterwards. But the devaluation of the 'as' did not affect the pivotal role of 
the denarius in the Roman monetary system. The denarius remained the index coin because 
one sestertius equaled one quarter of a denarius as unit of account.  
The Roman Republic often turned moneys of former foes into provincial coinages. 
This pragmatic attitude avoided disrupting commerce and it saved the cost of recoinage, but 
it made Roman coinage more complex. During most of the Republican era, the denarius 
circulated in the core provinces in Italy and in the western Mediterranean, where the conflict 
with Carthage had ended with the total destruction of Carthaginian civilization. In the eastern 
Mediterranean the Romans, who admired Greek civilization, assimilated local customs. It 
                                                 
16 The choice of monetary metal may be understood as Nash equilibrium. Merchants set 
commodity  prices  (in  terms  of  'as'  money  of  account)  expecting  that  people  would  use 
overvalued silver coins in payments. Vice versa, people used overvalued silver coins because 
merchants set commodity prices accordingly. Rolnick and Weber (1986) and Sargent and 
Smith (1997) deal with the microeconomic foundations of Gresham's Law. 
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took about a century from the annexation of Macedon (148 BC) and western Turkey (129 
BC) until Roman money spread to the East. Still, the economic significance of provincial 
coinages should not be overemphasized, however interesting they may be from a numismatic 
standpoint. After the Second Punic War, Rome ran a national monetary system that was 
based upon the silver denarius. It seems likely that provincial coinages were valued in terms 





During the civil wars in the first century BC, most protagonists struck coins. Julius 
Caesar marched on Rome in 49 BC, where he seized the well endowed Republican treasury. 
This windfall enabled him to strike vast quantities of silver denarii and gold aurei, which 
undoubtedly strengthened his political position. Despite the civil strife, the quality of Roman 
coinage remained strong in the first century BC. The military leaders operated in a highly 
competitive environment with shifting spheres of influence that depended on the tide of war. 
Intense competition – economic, political and military – prevented them from inflating by 
reducing the mint weight and fineness of coins. People could easily switch between coinages, 
making the demand for each brand of coins sensitive to changes in purchasing power. Only 
Mark Antony struck substandard denarii shortly before his downfall, a desperate measure 
that did not save him. 
Unlike  Republican  precious  metal  coinage,  Caesar’s  coinage  did  not  carry  value 
marks. He must have been aware of the fact that Republican bimetallism had failed because 
silver coins were officially overvalued relative to gold coins. The deliberate omission of 
value marks gave rise to a bimetallic coinage in which silver and gold coins circulated jointly 
at market determined exchange rates that were quoted in terms of sestertii. Crawford (1985, 
p. 243) notes that the denominations of Caesar’s gold coins remain uncertain. Caesar’s return 
to unmarked coinage provided a watershed in Western monetary history that has not yet 
found due recognition among monetary historians. From Caesar’s time until the eighteenth 
century, precious metal coins did not carry value marks. For almost two millennia, major 
coins were designed to circulate at market determined exchange rates that, taking account of   13
wear and tear and deliberate abuse, depended on the true metal weight of coins and metal 
prices.  
In  27  BC,  Octavian  became  the  first  Roman  emperor,  assuming  the  name  of 
Augustus. His role in establishing imperial coinage is often exaggerated. By the time he 
ascended to the imperial throne, a bimetallic monetary system had already emerged. At its 
heart, Augustan precious metal coinage was Caesarean. Augustus’s contribution to imperial 
coinage was limited to the reform of base coinage, abandoning low quality bronze in favor of 
brass (sestertius and dupondius) and copper ('as', semis and quadrans). But the make of base 
coinage  was  irrelevant  because  token  coins  circulated  at  assigned  values  in  small  daily 
transactions.  
One complication arises because one Augustan aureus was officially tariffed at 25 
denarii. It seems that this official tariff was a less effective way of fixing exchange rates 
between  coins  than  the  earlier  use  of value marks.  Unlike Republican coinage, imperial 
coinage remained bimetallic for centuries. In fact, the prevalence of the sestertius unit of 
account explains why the official tariff between the silver denarius and gold aureus did not 
impede the working of bimetallism. Suppose a merchant bought commodities with a price of 
100 sestertii. Since sales contracts specified prices in sesterii, the merchant could pay by 
using any type of coin with a market value of 100 sestertii. There existed no opportunity to 
pay less by using aurei when gold was momentarily cheap. As coins were not denominated in 
sestertii, the seller was not obliged to accept aurei with a market value of less than 100 
sestertii. The official tariff remained ineffective because it is not possible to fix a relative 
price, here between silver and gold coins, by pure fiat.
17 The market ratio of aurei in terms of 
denarii often deviated from the official tariff of 25. There arose no arbitrage opportunity 
because no institution traded silver and gold at the official tariff. The emperors were not in 
the business of providing a grateful populace with an unlimited supply of undervalued coins 
that could be melted down at a profit. It seems that some recoinages during the first century 
                                                 
17 Suppose the government legislates that one apple should trade for three oranges. This 
would be of no consequence because, without coercion, no market would emerge in which 
the  two  commodities  are  exchanged  at  the official ratio. Effective price controls  always 
involve money prices of commodities. Monetary regulations during the Roman Republic 
(and  later  during  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries)  interfered  with  bimetallism 
because, using value marks on coins, the relative price of silver and gold was fixed indirectly 
by setting the money prices of silver and gold.   14
were motivated by the desire to realign the market ratio between denarii and aurei with the 
official tariff of 25. 
From Caesar’s time until the early third century, the weight of the silver denarius 
dropped from about 3.9 to 3 grams, and its fineness was approximately halved to 50%. This 
amounted to an average debasement of about 2.1% per year. In the same time period, the 
gold aureus fell from about 8 to 6.5 grams. The slow deterioration of precious metal coinage 
was  interrupted  by  several  short-lived  attempts  to  restore  it.  During  the  fourth  century, 
economic and social conditions worsened in the Roman Empire. The weight of the aureus 
fluctuated  strongly  and  the  denarius  became  a  base  coin.  In  301,  Diocletian  (~243-316) 
resorted to price controls in order to restrain inflation. Soon afterwards, Constantine (~280-
337) established a gold standard that was based on the solidus.  
 
3. Medieval Money 
After the demise of the Roman Empire, Europe experienced a period of social and 
economic retrogression.
18 By the sixth century, trade had come to a virtual standstill and, as a 
medium  of  exchange  was  no  longer  needed,  the  economy  became  almost  completely 
demonetized. Precious metal coinage was either hoarded or it was spent on luxuries that 
were imported from northern Africa and the East. During the eighth century, the revival of 
trade in the region of the English Channel and the North Sea generated a fresh demand for 
means of payment. A new silver penny coinage emerged, which dominated the European 
monetary system for the next five centuries. By the eighth century, the late Roman solidus 
system of account had given way to the medieval £/s/d system; one pound usually equaled 20 
shillings and one shilling was 12 pence. The notation £/s/d is etymologically linked to the 
Roman libra (pound), solidus and denarius. From the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, Europe 
experienced  a period  of prosperity that coincided  with  an  expansion of  silver mining in 
eastern Europe and an influx of gold across the Sahara from western Africa. In the thirteenth 
century, at the beginning of the Renaissance, northern Italian city states introduced gold 
coins  that  became  popular  means  of  payment  at fairs  and in cities along  Europe's trade 
routes. From then until the Industrial Revolution, European coinage included silver and gold 
coins.  
                                                 
18 Sources for this section include Spufford (1988) and Weber (1996).    15
Economic historians are often uncertain about the nature of medieval money. The 
difficulty is that it is usually not possible to establish a clear-cut relationship between pound 
money of account and a specific index coin. Knowledge of medieval monetary regulations is 
incomplete  and  medieval  coins  did  not  carry  value  marks  in  terms  of  £/s/d.  As  a 
consequence, many economic historians have been influenced by the idea that the pound was 
an 'abstract' or 'imaginary' unit of account whose purchasing power did not depend on that of 
an index coin. In particular, Einaudi (1937, 1953/36) insisted that the purchasing power of 
the pound was determined solely by "the common opinion of the people."
19  
The notion of abstract money of account does not provide an effective tool for the 
analysis of the medieval monetary system. The fact that it is now difficult to determine what 
coin acted as index coin does not mean that there was no index coin at all. In fact, the 
medieval monetary system strongly resembled that of ancient Greece. Reflecting the political 
fragmentation of medieval Europe, coins were supplied by a large number of mints that were 
controlled  by  small  political  entities  with  often  interlocking  spheres  of  influence  – 
principalities, cities and church bodies. Coins did not carry value marks, allowing for market 
determined  exchange  rates.  Therefore,  imperfect  coins  could  be  used  at  their  true  metal 
weight, and silver  and gold coins circulated side by side at variable exchange rates that 
reflected  the  market  determined  silver-gold  ratio.  Yet,  although  the  unit  of  account  was 
separate from the medium of exchange, pound money of account was not abstract. Instead, 
the official mint weight of an index coin, either through convention or some official decree, 
determined the purchasing power of each pound money of account. 
Weber  (1996) provides  an  econometric analysis of  the  monetary system of Basle 
during the late Middle Ages. Basle was a medium-sized city along the trade route from 
northern  Italy  across  the  Swiss  Alps  to  Flanders  and  the  Baltic,  connecting  the  most 
prosperous regions of medieval Europe. The city was a significant commercial and political 
center  within  the  loosely  structured  Holy  Roman  Empire  (despite  its  name  essentially 
Germany).  A Church Council sat in Basle from 1431-37/48, which was attended by the 
Emperor in 1433-34. Coinage consisted of local silver pennies and foreign coins that had 
                                                 
19 Van Werveke (1934) and de Roover (1948, pp. 220/221) questioned Einaudi's concept of 
imaginary money. Cipolla (1956, chs 4 and 5) discussed 'ghost moneys' in southern Europe. 
Lane and Mueller (1985, ch. 20) review the positions of economic historians on medieval 
pound moneys of account. White (1984) and Spufford (1988, Appendix II) reject the notion 
of abstract money.   16
been acquired through trade. Popular gold coins included florins and ducats from Italy, and 
German rhinegulden. Commodity prices were quoted in local pound money of account and 
payments were made in an assortment of coins whose exchange rates were also expressed in 
pound. The econometric analysis of exchange rates by Weber (1996) shows that the behavior 
of the pound price of gold, the pound price of silver, and the silver-gold ratio cannot be 
reconciled with the notion that nominal values were autonomous. Instead, Basle's monetary 
system was based on the local silver penny, supplemented by foreign gold coins whose value 
in terms of £/s/d was determined by the official mint weight of the penny.  
A metallic monetary standard does not provide a safeguard against inflation because 
the  monetary  authority  can  debase  the  index  coin  by  reducing  its  weight  and  fineness. 
Spufford (1988) graphed the price of gold in terms of local pound moneys of account in a 
dozen medieval cities and countries, and Redish (2000) provides new time series for France 
and England. Particular violent inflations, in some cases repeatedly, occurred in Bohemia, 
France, Flanders, Austria, Castille and Cologne, whereas the pound units of the Italian city 
states,  Aragon  and  England  remained  quite  stable.  The  motives  of  deliberate  inflation 
included  seigniorage  during  fiscal  emergencies  and  the  redistribution  of  wealth  between 
social  groups.
20  Since  the  nobility's  income  from  feudal  privileges  was  denominated  in 
pound money of account, inflation shifted wealth away from the nobility to the ascendant 
mercantile class during the late Middle Ages. These inflationary episodes confirm that the 
government was in control of the mint weight of some index coin, manipulating it to its own 
advantage.  
Debasements of the index coin, which produces inflation, must be distinguished from 
debasements of non-index coinage, which affects only exchange rates of coins. Medieval 
monetary authorities often interfered with currency markets, leading to Gresham type effects. 
Exchange rates between coins were fixed through official tariffs and not through explicit 
value marks. But this practice should not be overemphasized as enforcement of exchange 
rates was haphazard and eventually all coins traded at their true metal value. The monetary 
authorities imposed a seigniorage tax by issuing unmarked silver coins at overvalued rates, 
which were enforced in selective transactions. Not surprisingly, overvalued coins attracted 
                                                 
20 Bordo (1986), Sussman (1993), Gandal and Sussman (1997), and Selgin and White (1999) 
stress the role of seigniorage in medieval public finance. Rolnick, Velde and Weber (1996)   17
profiteers  who  tried  to  appropriate  some  of  the  government’s  profit  by  clipping  coins. 
Governments fought off this unwanted competition with severe punishments, without much 
success. As a consequence, the quality of medieval silver coins was extremely poor, wear 
and tear and maltreatment often reduced their weight by one third or more. The quality of 
gold coins was better than that of silver coins because high-value gold coins were used at 
their metal weight in international transactions.   
  
4. Coinage on the Eve of the Industrial Revolution 
During the Middle Ages, most coins were manufactured by the method of striking, in 
which a blank piece of metal was placed between two dies and the upper die was struck with 
a hammer. Blanks were cut from cast metal rods that were hammered until they had the 
required thickness.
21 The basic process of coinage, producing blanks and striking coins, did 
not change until the introduction of the rolling mill and screw press in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth  centuries.  Redish  (2000)  observes  that  the  advantage  of  these  new  minting 
technologies was an improved quality of coins, whereas they did not reduce minting cost. 
Despite the introduction of the rolling mill and screw press, the quality of circulating coins 
remained poor because coins deteriorated once they were put into circulation, and replacing 
them was too costly before the mechanization of the process of coinage. The deterioration of 
coins  occurred  through  wear  and  tear  and,  in  the  presence  of  unrealistic  official  tariffs, 
deliberate tampering. After the Revolution of 1688, the English government adopted wide 
ranging fiscal and monetary reforms, which also involved a recoinage of silver coins in 1695. 
Since gold coins were officially overvalued, a de facto gold standard emerged, in which 
silver coins were used as means of payment only if they were worn or abused. Complaints 
about the low quality of British silver coins were frequent in the eighteenth century. Lord 
Liverpool (1805) reckoned that the average shilling had lost perhaps one sixth of its full 
weight and the average sixpence one quarter by 1760.
22  
                                                                                                                                                        
question the effectiveness of debasements, and Redish (2000) downplays the seigniorage 
motive for inflation. 
21 Some base metal coins whose exact metal weight was unimportant were directly cast. In 
Roman times, the blanks were cast and their weight was adjusted. See Cooper (1988) for 
technical information on the process of coinage. 
  
22 Craig (1953) includes sources on the wear of English coins back to the thirteenth century. 
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The following anonymous account tells of fraudulent practices that were widespread 
in Great Britain during the eighteenth century, "my grandfather was a shorter … by which is 
meant a gentleman who  shortens  or reduces the current coin of these realms, for which 
practice he was scragg'd, that is, hung by the scrag of the neck … (he) shortened the coin of 
this country by three processes. By aquafortis, by clipping, and by filing. Filing and clipping 
he employed in reducing all kinds of coin, whether gold or silver; but aquafortis he used 
merely in reducing gold coin … By laying a guinea in aquafortis for twelve hours he could 
filch from it to the value of ninepence … the aquafortis eating the gold away and leaving it 
like a sediment in the vessel … From a five-shilling piece … he would file or clip to the 
value of fivepence, and from lesser coin in proportion" (Cooper 1988, pp. 42 and 125). But 
even in the absence of unrealistic exchange rates and abuse, it was too costly to replace worn 
pieces as long as the process of coinage remained a laborious process with few economies of 
scale. 
A coin has three surfaces that may all carry designs – the top, the bottom and the 
narrow rim around the edge. The traditional method of coinage, striking, stamped an imprint 
on the top and bottom. In the eighteenth century, it became practical to protect coins against 
filing  and  clipping  by  putting  designs  on  the  rim.  More  importantly,  the  invention  of 
industrial coining presses produced a quality improvement in coin circulation between 1780 
and 1820. Matthew Boulton, who collaborated with James Watt, constructed a steam driven 
coining press in England in the 1780s. Paul Gengembre and Jean-Pierre Droz, both of the 
Paris Mint, designed mechanisms that automatically fed blanks and extracted coins. In 1817, 
Diedrich Uhlhorn, who had worked as engineer at the Dusseldorf Mint, patented the knuckle 
press,  which  had  many  applications  in  the  metal-working  industry  besides  coinage.  The 
mechanization  of  mints  improved  the  quality  of  coins  for  two  reasons:  it  increased  the 
standardization of coins and, by reducing minting cost, it made it economically feasible to 
replace worn pieces.  
 
5. Nineteenth Century Bimetallism 
Before the Industrial Revolution, the unit of account was separate from the medium 
of  exchange because the  quality  of coins was poor. All coins, including the index coin, 
circulated at market determined exchange rates that were expressed in terms of the official 
mint weight of the index coin. The index coin stayed on an equal footing with other coins as   19
medium  of  exchange  until  the  quality  improvement  in  coinage  during  the  Industrial 
Revolution. Afterwards, the index coin and its multiples and fractions all circulated by tale. 
The unit of account function and medium of exchange function of the index coin fused, 
giving it a decisive advantage as medium of exchange. If the monetary unit was defined in 
terms of silver, all silver coins circulated by tale, while gold coins continued to trade at 
exchange rates that depended on the market determined silver-gold ratio. In this situation, 
silver coins gained an advantage as medium of exchange because their ability to pass by tale 
reduced transaction costs. Vice versa, gold coins became the primary medium of exchange if 
the  monetary  unit  was  defined  in  terms  of  gold.  The  quality  improvement  in  coinage 
accounted for the transformation of the monetary system from pre-industrial bimetallism to 
de facto monometallism at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Value marks 
played no role in the demise of pre-industrial bimetallism, although they accounted for the 
difficulties of nineteenth century bimetallism. The unit of account function and medium of 
exchange function of the index coin would have fused with or without the use of value 
marks. Actually, the introduction of value marks is just another indication of the quality 
improvement in coins because it seems natural to put value marks on high quality coins that 
circulate by tale. Thus, technological advance in the process of coinage explains both the 
emergence of de facto monometallism and the adoption of value marks.  
The demise of bimetallism during the Industrial Revolution may be thought of as 
having occurred in two steps. First, the quality improvement in coinage gave rise to de facto 
monometallism by fusing the unit of account function of the index coin with the medium of 
exchange function. The ability to circulate by tale gave the index coin and its multiples and 
fractions  a  decisive  advantage  as  medium  of  exchange.  Second,  the  use  of  value  marks 
representing a single monetary unit engendered fixed exchange rates between silver and gold 
coins.  This  created  an  alternating  bimetallic  standard  in  which,  depending  on  market 
conditions, the make of the currency shifted between silver and gold. The first step, the 
emergence of de facto monometallism, was an unavoidable consequence of technological 
advance in the process of coinage during the Industrial Revolution. The second step, the 
formation of an alternating bimetallic standard, was not strictly necessary because there was 
no need to put unitary value marks representing a single monetary unit on both silver and 
gold coins. However, transaction costs precluded a system of parallel currencies in which 
silver and gold coinage – each carrying its own set of value marks representing different   20





The main objective of this study is to show that the concept of index coin is fruitful in 
the  analysis  of  the  vast  amount  of  source  material  that  has  been  collected  by  monetary 
historians and numismatists. The notion of index coin is a theoretical construct whose merit 
can  be  established  only  by  applying  it  in  historical  monetary  research.  The  index  coin 
hypothesis is attractive because it employs economic theory: standard price theory explains 
the exchange value of a unit of monetary metal, and the official mint weight of the index 
coin  anchors  the  purchasing  power  of  the  unit  of  account.  There  exists  no  competing 
hypothesis in the literature on monetary history and numismatics that is equally successful in 
explaining the operation of a metallic monetary standard with heterogeneous coinage. The 
hypothesis  of  an  abstract  unit  of  account  caused  hopeless  confusion  among  monetary 
historians  and  numismatists.  Most  monetary  historians  have  discarded  the  notion  of  an 
abstract unit of account because, after decades of research, it has turned out to be a hindrance 
to the understanding of metallic monetary standards, instead of a help. 
Monetary  economists  have  neglected  the  history  of  bimetallism.  This  is  hard  to 
understand  because  bimetallism  completely  dominated  monetary  history,  accounting  for 
about nine-tenths of it. The history of money is the history of bimetallism. The lack of a 
satisfactory analysis of pre-industrial bimetallism exposes a gap in monetary economics that 
requires  an  explanation.  Three  tacit  assumptions  render  modern  monetary  economics 
unsuitable  for  the  analysis  of  early  monetary  systems.  Monetary  economists  take  it  for 
granted that money is both unit of account and medium of exchange; currency is viewed as a 
homogenous aggregate whose components exchange at par; and the supply conditions of 
money are stripped down to the bare minimum, often involving only paper money that is 
supplied at no cost by the government. All three assumptions are appropriate abstractions in 
                                                 
23 Transaction costs also precluded a bimetallic system in which, say, value marks were put 
only on silver coins, allowing them to pass at par, while unmarked gold coins continued to 
circulate at market determined exchange rates. A bimetallic system in which one type of coin 
did not carry value marks was proposed during the public debate preceding the enactment of 
the subsidiary coinage bill in the United States in 1853 (See Martin (1973), footnote 69).   21
the  modern world, facilitating  the analysis  of national  monetary systems that are run by 
central banks. However, these assumptions have been detrimental to the understanding of 
bimetallism and its transformation during the Industrial Revolution. Before the Industrial 
Revolution the unit of account was separate from the medium of exchange, local currency 
consisted  of  a  multitude  of  coins  whose  exchange  rates  were  market  determined,  and 
currency was supplied competitively by a large number of mints at nontrivial costs.  
Bimetallism  had  become  a  dysfunctional  relic  by  the  early  nineteenth  century, 
although it lingered on for another seventy years. Sporadic changes between gold and silver 
coinage  accounted  for  monetary  instability.  A  switch  from  gold  to  silver  increased  the 
demand for bank notes and sight deposits relative to coins because heavy silver coins were 
inconvenient in commercial transactions. This produced an influx of funds into the banks 
that led to an expansion of credit. A change from silver to gold had the opposite effect, 
reducing  bank  reserves  and  credit.  Despite  the  shortcomings  of  nineteenth  century 
bimetallism, silver mining interests strongly lobbied for the maintenance of bimetallism, in 
particular in the United States.
24 But genuine bimetallism remained elusive because it was no 
longer supported by the fundamental technological and institutional conditions governing the 
process of coinage. In 1934, the United States made an ill-advised, last attempt to restore 
bimetallism,  preparing  for  silver  coinage  by  buying  huge  quantities  of  silver.  As  a 
consequence, the world price of silver increased, inducing an overvaluation of the silver 
currencies of China and India. This contributed to the ruin of the Chinese monetary system at 
a critical juncture of Chinese history.
25   
This study sheds light on a recent strand of monetary research that deals with laissez-
faire  monetary  systems.  Hayek  (1976/78)  proposed  that  currencies  should  be  issued 
competitively in order to achieve price stability. Accordingly, it has been argued that Europe 
                                                                                                                                                        
White  (1984)  suggested  that  transaction  costs  lead  to  a  single  unit  of  account  in  a 
competitive monetary system. 
24 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 113-119) discuss the 'Politics of Silver' in the United 
States. 
25 Cassel (1936, ch. 7) and Friedman (1992, ch. 7) criticize American silver policy during the 
Great Depression in the 1930s.    22
should  adopt  a  system  of  parallel  currencies,  instead  of  a  single  monetary  unit.
26  The 
preceding analysis shows that the concept of parallel currencies is ahistoric and implausible. 
Before the Industrial Revolution, there existed a strong tendency toward a single unit of 
account in the form of an index coin within an economic area, although mixed media of 
exchange were common.
27 The tendency toward a uniform unit of account within a single 
economic area is a key feature of monetary history. Yet, the emergence of a single unit of 
account defeats the purpose of competitive currency schemes. The adoption of a single unit 


















                                                 
26 Selgin and White (1994) review the literature on laissez-faire monetary systems. Salin 
(1984), Vaubel (1990) and De Grauwe (1997, pp. 165-170) deal with the parallel currency 
approach to European monetary unification.  
27  In  China  the  tael  system  of  account  survived  until  the  twentieth  century.  Like  pre-
industrial European pound units, tael units represented fixed amounts of silver. There were 
many local tael units, but usually a single unit of account prevailed in a city. King (1965) 
deals with the tael system during the second half of the nineteenth century. Glahn (1996) 
discusses Chinese money and monetary policy from 1000 to 1700. 
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